Immanuel Kant — “Fragment of a Moral Catechism”
from The Metaphysics of Morals
The following is a transcription of Immanuel Kant’s “Fragment of a Moral Catechism” found in The Metaphysics of Morals (6:480–6:485; p. 593–597 in the “Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant — Practical Philosophy”). This brief remark epitomizes much of Kant’s ethical theorizing and, in particular, how it relates to his religious views.
This brief excerpt is reproduced under the principles of fair dealing solely for non-profit, educational purposes. All rights belong to Cambridge University Press and associated parties.
Reproduced from: “Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant — Practical Philosophy,” trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Remark
Fragment of a moral catechism.
The teacher elicits from his pupil’s reason, by questioning, what he wants to teach him; and should the pupil not know how to answer the question, the teacher, guiding his reason, suggests the answer to him.
1. Teacher: What is your greatest, in fact your whole, desire in life?
Pupil: (is silent)
Teacher: That everything should always go the way you would like it to.
2. Teacher: What is such a condition called?
Pupil: (is silent)
Teacher: It is called happiness (continuous well-being, enjoyment of life, complete satisfaction with one’s condition).
3. Teacher: Now, if it were up to you to dispose of all happiness (possible in the world), would you keep it all for yourself or would you share it with your fellow human beings?
Pupil: I would share it with others and make them happy and satisfied too.
4. Teacher: Now that proves that you have a good enough heart; but let us see whether you have a good head to go along with it. — Would you really give a lazy fellow soft cushions so that he could pass his life away in sweet idleness? Or would you see to it that a drunkard is never short of wine and whatever else he needs to get drunk? Would you give a swindler a charming air and manner to dupe other people? And would you give a violent man audacity and strong fists so that he could crush other people? Each of these things is a means that somebody wishes for in order to be happy in his own way.
Pupil: No, I would not.
5. Teacher: You see, then, that even if you had all happiness in your hands and, along with it, the best will, you still would not give it without consideration to anyone who put out his hand for it; instead you would first try to find out to what extent each was worthy of happiness. But as for yourself, would you at least have no scruples about first providing yourself with everything that you count in your happiness?
Pupil: I would have none.
Teacher: But doesn’t it occur to you to ask, again, whether you yourself are worthy of happiness?
Pupil: Of course.
Teacher: Now the force in you that strives only toward happiness is inclination; but that which limits your inclination to the condition of your first being worthy of happiness is your reason; and your capacity to restrain and overcome your inclinations by your reason is the freedom of your will.
6. Teacher: As to how you should set about sharing in happiness and also becoming at least not unworthy of it, the rule and instruction in this lies in your reason alone. This amounts to saying that you need not learn this rule for your conduct from experience or be taught it by others. Your own reason teaches you what you have to do and directly commands you to do it. Suppose, for example, that a situation arises in which you could get a great benefit for yourself or your friend by making up a subtle lie that would harm no one: What does your reason say about it?
Pupil: That I ought not to lie, no matter how great the benefits to myself and my friend might be. Lying is mean and makes a human being unworthy of happiness. — Here is an unconditional necessitation through a command (or prohibition) of reason, which I must obey; and in the face of it all my inclinations must be silent.
Teacher: What do we call this necessity, which reason lays directly upon a human being, of acting in conformity with its law?
Pupil: It is called duty.
Teacher: So a human being’s observance of his duty is the universal and sole condition of his worthiness to be happy, and his worthiness to be happy is identical with his observance of duty.
7. Teacher: But even if we are conscious of such a good and active will in us, by virtue of which we consider ourselves worthy (or at least not unworthy) of happiness, can we base on this a sure hope of sharing in happiness?
Pupil: No, not on this alone. For it is not always within our power to provide ourselves with happiness, and the course of nature does not of itself conform with merit. Our good fortune in life (our welfare in general) depends, rather, on circumstances that are far from all being in our control. So our happiness always remains a wish that cannot become a hope, unless some other power is added.
8. Teacher: Has reason, in fact, any grounds of its own for assuming the existence of such a power, which apportions happiness in accordance with a human being’s merit or guilt, a power ordering the whole of nature and governing the world with supreme wisdom? that is, any grounds for believing in God?
Pupil: Yes. For we see in the works of nature, which we can judge, a wisdom so widespread and profound that we can explain it to ourselves only by the inexpressibly great art of a creator of the world. And with regard to the moral order, which is the highest adornment of the world, we have reason to expect a no less wise regime, such that if we do not make ourselves unworthy of happiness, by violating our duty, we can also hope to share in happiness.
In this catechism, which must be carried out through all the articles of virtue and vice, the greatest care must be taken to base the command of duty not on the advantages or disadvantages that follow from observing it, whether for the one it is to put under obligation or even for others, but quite purely on the moral principle. Only casual mention should be made of advantages and disadvantages, as of a supplement which could really be dispensed with but which is serviceable, merely as an instrument, for the taste of those who are weak by nature. It is the shamefulness of vice, not its harmfulness (to the agent himself), that must be emphasized above all. For unless the dignity of virtue is exalted above everything else in actions, the concept of duty itself vanishes and dissolves into mere pragmatic precepts, since a human being’s consciousness of his own nobility then disappears and he is for sale and can be bought for a price that the seductive inclinations offer him.
Now when this is wisely and carefully developed out of a human being’s own reason, with regard for the differences in age, sex and rank which he gradually encounters, then there is still something that must come at the end, which moves the soul inwardly and puts him in a position in which he can look upon himself only with the greatest wonder at the original predisposition dwelling within him, the impression of which is never erased. — When, namely, at the end of his instruction his duties are once more, by way of summary, recounted in their order (recapitulated); and when, in the case of each of them, his attention is drawn to the fact that none of the pains, hardships, and sufferings of life — not even the threat of death — which may befall him because he faithfully attends to his duty can rob him of consciousness of being their master and superior to them all, then the question is very close to him: what is it in you that can be trusted to enter into combat with all the forces of nature within you and around you and to conquer them if they come into conflict with your moral principles? Although the solution to this question lies completely beyond the capability of speculative reason, the question arises of itself; and if he takes it to heart, the very incomprehensibility in this cognition of himself must produce an exaltation in his soul which only inspires it the more to hold its duty sacred, the more it is assailed.
In this catechistic moral instruction it would be most helpful to the pupil’s moral development to raise some casuistical questions in the analysis of every duty and to let the assembled children test their understanding by having each say how he would solve the tricky problem put to him. — The advantage of this is not only that it is a cultivation of reason most suited to the capacity of the undeveloped (since questions about what one’s duty is can be decided far more easily than speculative questions), and so is the most appropriate way to sharpen the understanding of young people in general. Its advantage lies especially in the fact that it is natural for a human being to love a subject which he has, by his own handling, brought to a science (in which he is now proficient); and so, by this sort of practice, the pupil is drawn without noticing it to an interest in morality.
But it is most important in this education not to present the moral catechism mixed with the religious one (to combine them into one) or, what is worse yet, to have it follow upon the religious catechism. On the contrary, the pupil must always be brought to a clear insight into the moral catechism, which should be presented with the utmost diligence and thoroughness. For otherwise the religion that he afterwards professes will be nothing but hypocrisy; he will acknowledge duties out of fear and feign an interest in them that is not in his heart.